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HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH. By
C. Edwin Baker.t New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press.
1989. Pp. viii, 385. Cloth, $39.95.
John Stick2

Professor C. Edwin Baker has for the last dozen years been one
of our most intelligent and interesting commentators on the first
amendment. This book contains previously-published writings on
free speech, plus much that is new or revised. The first half of the
book presents a liberty theory of the first amendment, and a critique
of other competing theories, particularly those derived from the
metaphor of the marketplace of ideas. Baker's theory can be seen in
greater depth and complexity here than in his isolated articles; the
cohesive presentation in the first five chapters will become the primary source for scholars seeking to evaluate his theoretical work.
The last six chapters apply his theory to selected doctrinal topics
such as time, place, and manner regulations, parade permits, commercial speech, and press rights.
Although Professor Baker champions a liberty theory of the
first amendment, he does not begin with a justification of liberty
of speech. Instead, Baker begins with a rebuttal of what he describes as the prevailing orthodoxy: marketplace theories of the
first amendment. Marketplace theories posit a goal of discovering
truth and assert that a regime of unregulated speech is more likely
to recognize truth and expose error than a regime of governmentally regulated speech. Baker explicitly identifies marketplace theories with utilitarian or general welfare theories about speech; he
presents his theory by contrast as an anti-utilitarian theory, much as
Dworkin introduces his theory as an anti-utilitarian theory of
rights. After describing the marketplace theory and then his liberty
theory, Baker walks them through a range of first amendment
problems such as blackmail and whistle blowing, and the speech/
action distinction. Finally, in the one part of the theoretical analysis that explicitly expresses his progressive political agenda, Baker
states that "a central function of rights protected by the first amendment analysis is to contribute to a legitimate, democratic process for
achieving needed change." He then proceeds to compare the liberty
and marketplace theories, and concludes that marketplace theories
reinforce the status quo, while the liberty theory protects rights and
promotes progressive social change.
1.

2.

Nicholas F. Gallichio Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
Associate Professor of Law, Tulane University.
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Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech is more a work of theory than of case commentary. It lacks the sustained exploration of
factual situations, or the systematic exploration of areas of doctrine,
of works such as Emerson's The System of Freedom of Expression
or Kalven's A Worthy Tradition. Yet neither does Human Liberty
attempt a sustained and coherent exploration of first amendment
theory comparable to Frederick Schauer's Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry. Baker seems to be attempting a middle course
that presents theory and selected doctrinal problems together, using
each to illuminate the other without presenting a complete account
of either by itself. The integration of theory and context is a commendable aim, but much depends on how it is carried out.
I

Baker begins his argument by distinguishing between two types
of theories of the first amendment: marketplace theories and liberty
theories. He gives the impression that marketplace theories are
much more numerous; his sole example of a liberty theory is his
own. He situates these competing theories in the broader context of
political philosophy: marketplace theories are utilitarian, instrumentalist, objectivist. His own liberty theory hews close to the oldfashioned ACLU verities in substance, but the theoretical roots to
which he alludes range from Dworkinian natural rights theory, to
the account of dialogic reciprocity of European theorists such as
Jurgen Habermas, to a postmodernist rejection of the notion of objective truth.
Baker uses general theory less to elaborate his own position
than to criticize other theories; the content of his own theory is developed more in the contextual discussion of particular issues.
From one point of view, this was a wise choice: to have overlain his
distinction between noncommercial and commercial speech with
the Habermasian distinctions between system and lifeworld, for example, or between communicative and strategic action,3 would have
only exacerbated his problems of persuasion while making the
whole theoretical edifice too unwieldy to manage. Moreover,
Baker's contextual discussions are invariably illuminating. On the
other hand, it is always suspicious to treat one's own theory differently from its competitors by subjecting them to tests from which
one's own theory is exempted. Baker develops the marketplace theory by means of general theoretical assumptions that he submits to
3. For an application of these aspects of Habermas's theory to the first amendment, see
Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First Amendment Freedom of
Speech, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 54 (1989).
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analysis; he develops his own theory in context. The suspicions
raised by this differential treatment are borne out in the details of
Baker's criticisms. He contends that the marketplace theory assumes that truth is objective, that individuals seek the truth by rationally processing the data applied by the marketplace of ideas,
and that people's goals are unitary, stable, and undisturbed by the
products of the marketplace of ideas. Baker criticizes all three assumptions. His criticisms are meant to perform two functions-to
distinguish the marketplace theory from his own view, and to explain why the marketplace theory is unsatisfactory-but they fail on
both counts.
With the second and third assumptions, Baker interprets marketplace theories as being precursors to law and economics and interest group pluralism. Surely this is an accurate portrait only of
some marketplace theorists. Holmes was a much more subtle and
social thinker than these assumptions imply. The most ironic twist
occurs when critics of the complacent invocation of the marketplace
metaphor, such as Jerome Barron who proposed a right of access
for citizens to the mass media, are labelled by Baker as market failure theorists.4 For Baker, the market failure theorist is just a subspecies of the marketplace theorist. The use of "market failure"
here is a compelling rhetorical move. It not only suggests that Barron accepts the assumptions underlying the marketplace theory; it
makes his access theory sound vaguely economic. Barron, however,
does not rely on economic analysis to argue for his theory. He developed his call for a citizen's right of access to speak in established
newspapers and broadcast stations in response to the failure of the
protest movements of the mid-60s to gain a "full and effective hearing" in the marketplace of ideas.s The general problem here, which
recurs elsewhere in the book, is a failure to fully engage the theories
of particular authors rather than abstract generic positions. This
failure, which seems to be due to politeness rather than egotism,
naturally leads to oversimplification of opponents' views.
Baker's criticism of the theory of the individual presupposed
by the marketplace theory is also ironic because Baker himself is
vulnerable to the same type of charge. To oversimplify, radical
communitarians criticize many liberals for excessive individualism.
Part of the substance of this criticism is the same as Baker's criticism of marketplace theory: liberalism assumes that people have
unitary and stable identities, preferences and goals, so that the lib4.

Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80

1641 (1967).
5. Jd. at 1647.

HARV.

L. REv.
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eral process of political adjustment can be seen as the fair compromise and adjustment of existing claims rather than the social
molding of personality to prefer some outcomes to others. In law,
this line of criticism is most prominently pursued by some members
of critical legal studies as part of their critique of rights.6 These
writers would find Baker's theory individualistic because it focuses
exclusively on protecting the expressive and associational liberties
of individual speakers from government interference. Baker does
not pay much attention to those nongovernmental social influences
that both make self-realization through expression possible and
threaten to distort it. He does not discuss, for example, the hard
first amendment issues rising from community control over education. He dismisses many of the free speech problems raised by inequalities of wealth by stating that redistribution of wealth is a
separate issue. He does not fully discuss issues where some progressives advocate restraining the liberty of individuals such as the new
critique of pornography and the call to create criminal and tort liability for racist speech. Baker's criticism of marketplace theories
implicitly promises that his own theory will display a more wellrounded account of the individual, but he does not fulfill that
promise.
Indeed Baker, even more than the marketplace theorists, is an
individualist on first amendment issues because in neither his theory
nor his contextual discussions does he identify any constitutional
role for government in helping to create an environment where selfrealization will flourish, or to protect one individual from other private individuals or groups that attempt to influence or stifle choice
of expression. For Baker's theory, the individual is complete and
competent to exercise liberty of expression so long as government
does not interfere; the purpose of the first amendment is to prevent
government censorship, and detecting subtle forms of censorship in,
say, parade permit requirements is the task his theory sets for itself.
To be fair, Baker is in favor of statutory, not constitutional,
initiatives to provide citizens with educational and other resources
to facilitate self-expression. He favors redistribution of wealth,
though not wealth-related restrictions on campaign speech. The
words of the first amendment prohibit the government from restricting speech and so a first amendment theorist like Baker naturally focuses on government censorship. My point is not that
Baker's positions are obviously mistaken; only that they are as individualistic as those of a marketplace liberal.
6. See Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1563 (1984).
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Baker's claim that the marketplace theory is disfnguished by
the assumption that the truth is objective is also a distortion. As
Holmes said in his Abrams dissent, anyone who firmly believes in an
objective truth that is readily ascertained does not need the marketplace theory: the government can act directly to protect the truth
and regulate false speech. Theories that protect the process by
which truth is determined, rather than substantive truths themselves, are only necessary if the process is more certain than the
substance. Holmes's lack of faith in objective truth is notorious.
Marketplace theories float in the mainstream of liberal political theory: they appeal most to those who believe that "truths" about
politics and morality cannot be determined independently of pluralistic, democratic processes. This is precisely Baker's own position. 1
It has become almost commonplace to criticize theorists for
assuming that truth is objective, but such criticisms are never illuminating when stated at such a high level of abstraction. All such
critics, most emphatically including Baker, continually make use of
precisely the same epistemology that they criticize in others. The
problem stems in part from the complexities of the concept of objectivity-which such critics are rarely willing to sort out. Instead,
they use the ambiguities of the concept to attribute it to others while
refusing to see it in themselves. For example, Baker finds a belief in
objective truth in Mill, Holmes, and Brandeis in part because they
at times used the locution "discover the truth"-as if subjective
feelings and intersubjective agreements were not also at times discovered. Luckily for the reader Baker does not take the pledge concerning discoveries; he discovers illuminating arguments about first
amendment problems on almost every page.
The real shame about overgeneralized critiques of objectivity is
that they conceal a very important, more specific intellectual problem. Feminists and critical race scholars often demonstrate that
doctrines, theories, and narratives that purport to describe universal
human experience have actually excluded the experience of women
and minorities. This wrongful claim of universality is often discussed as a false claim of objectivity- in part because white male
defenders of the old theory dismiss criticism of it as subjective. But
the language of objectivity and subjectivity here is too abstract to
capture the real dispute. Grand overgeneralizations that "the truth
is objective" or "the truth is subjective" are meaningless in them7. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., for example, was strongly influenced by the pragmatist
theories of truth of C.S. Peirce, who defined truth as that which emerged as the end of a
public process of rational, scientific inquiry. Baker aligns his epistemology with Jurgen
Haberrnas, whose ideal speech situation is an explicit descendant of Peirce's theory.
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selves, and obscure important problems. In first amendment theory, both marketplace theories and the quasi-absolutist tradition of
which Baker is a part have been insufficiently sensitive to the problem of excluded voices.
Baker also attempts to keep his theory separate from traditional liberal theory by claiming that liberal marketplace theories
are theories of process. What about Baker's own theory? Baker
does not believe in objective truth, although he does believe that a
liberty theory of the first amendment is the best theory. Some liberty theorists justify a strong interpretation of the first amendment
on the ground that such an interpretation is necessary to establish a
strong democracy. Thus free speech is instrumental to obtaining
the substantive good of democracy. Baker, however, believes that
democracy is an instrumental, and not an ultimate value; relationships of dialogic reciprocity are the ultimate value and democracy is
conducive to them. But for Baker, dialogic reciprocity seems to be
synonymous with the continuous exercise of first amendment freedoms. In other words, rather than the first amendment being a valuable means to a functioning democracy, democracy is a means to
the good society, which is defined by-an absolutist theory of the
first amendment. This is more than a little bizarre. Baker criticizes
other theories of the first amendment which treat it as a means, not
an end, as a process, rather than as substance. But his theory is the
ultimate deification of process: process becomes substance because
nothing else is left.
This transubstantiation of process into substance is the more
glaring because it is the only substance Baker provides. He does not
give even an abbreviated account of the good life other than the selfrealizing virtues of open conversation. He does not acknowledge
the full status of any liberty except self-expression. It might seem
that in a book about the first amendment, such material is superfluous. Hard first amendment cases, however, usually involve a conflict between free speech and some other right or liberty, often a
right of private property. Baker assures us early on that he does not
mean to trample on rights to private property, and that homeowners can still use the law of trespass to get protesters off the front
lawn, but in later examples he almost always expresses anti-speech
interests as governmental interests and ignores private concerns.
More generally, once he criticizes others for failing to have an account of the substance of the good life protected by the first amendment, he invites speculation about the justification of his own
account. The failure to embed his discussion of the value of free
speech in a more general theory of the human good, however
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sketchily drawn, makes his own theory seem ad hoc and his criticisms opportunistic.
Baker's relationship to liberal marketplace theories is really
quite similar to the relationship to liberalism of Cass Sunstein and
Roberto Unger, each of whom takes one aspect of procedural liberalism and attempts to build a consistent and substantial political
theory around it. All three begin with the (admittedly fair and
widely held) account of liberalism as a modus vivendi among individuals who have widely differing conceptions of the good life. Liberalism, on this account, is a theory of politics that by design
forsakes the attempt to describe, let alone enforce, a vision of the
good life, in order to present a set of fair ground rules for the common life of diverse individuals. Sunstein's neo-republicanism criticizes current liberal theory (and particularly interest group
pluralism) for a narrowly self-interested loss of concern with the
public good. It claims to be republican by providing a theory of
virtue. But the only concrete virtues praised by the neo-republicans
are the virtues of a political process working in the public interest.
These are process virtues, virtues of an appropriate means to a good
political end. Unlike Aristotle, the neo-republicans do not give an
account of the virtues, or of any other aspect of the good life, apart
from the political process. They also fail to suggest how politics,
now a minor aspect of the life of the average citizen, can be restored
to the central role it purportedly played in the life of a citizen of a
Greek polis in the time of Aristotle. Sunstein's republicanism provides a worthy supplement to interest group pluralism, but it is
manifestly a liberal theory rather than an Aristotelean one. (And is
the better for it.) It is a theory about a fair and well-functioning
political process and not a theory of the good life, or of the substance of ethical theory, apart from the minimum necessary to uphold that process. Sunstein takes process so seriously he makes it
substance, but that is so liberal it is, to borrow a term, super-liberal.
Unger's relationship to liberalism in his later works is similar,
except that he turns to substance the liberal concern for the individual tyrannized by the power of her context. Unger's political vision
is a super-individualism, where the state always stands by to help
the individual transcend the restraints posed by any social structure, including the state itself. Baker's vision can be seen as a limited version of Unger's: the good is self-expressive activity (rather
than all individual activity). Baker's vision is not itself a full and
rich vision of the good life. Baker is in favor of self-realizationwho isn't?-but he does not tell us one word about what a realized
self looks like. (Indeed, any theorist with a blueprint for what a
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realized self, or a realized life, looked like, would frighten almost
everyone away.) But this indicates that his vision is super-liberal,
which is to say, after all, liberal. His "substantive" vision of the
good life is a vision of the means by which individuals with different
sets of values can live harmoniously together. And so his criticisms
of proceduralism, instrumentalism and liberalism are overdone. He
may be taking these things seriously, he may be perfecting them,
but he is not offering an essentially different theory.
II

Can one construct a first amendment theory solely from the
concepts of liberty, autonomy, and self-realization? Baker gives a
brief general overview of his own theory, but his discussion does not
attempt to fully describe or justify it. He identifies the fundamental
purposes of the first amendment as self-fulfillment and participation
in change. Self-fulfillment is glossed as autonomy or self-realization; participation in change-a strikingly individualistic right-is
left unelaborated until a later chapter.
In defining speech, Baker objects to views that identify speech
with acts of communication-such as those advanced by Thomas
Scanlon.s Baker points out that speech is often used in solitude (diaries, outlines) and in ceremonial or institutional settings where
communication is secondary to participating in some form of activity. He therefore proposes that the definition of speech be broadened to "emphasize the speech's source in the self," rather than the
element of communication. Baker wants to change the emphasis
from communication to self-expression because he wants to privilege speakers' rights over listeners' rights and so deny part of the
foundation of marketplace theories. The difficulty raised by his
move is that many activities that express the self are not traditionally considered to be protected by the first amendment. Any activity done by a self can be considered as expressive of that self: selling
surfboards, playing kickball in your neighbor's rose garden, building a second story garret on a house in a neighborhood zoned for
one-story dwellings. The speech/action distinction causes a great
deal of confusion in first amendment doctrine because communications are also actions, and sometimes seem properly to be regulated
as such. Baker's theoretical comments exacerbate the problem by
potentially protecting all actions as self-expression. As elsewhere,
Baker fails to give sufficient attention to the need to explain why the
8.

Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, I

PHIL.
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204 (1972).

172

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 8:164

first amendment specifically protects speech, and not autonomy,
self-realization, self-expression, or liberty in general.
Widening the definition of speech makes it even more important to delineate categories of speech that will remain unprotected.
Speech that causes certain types of harms is not protected: consider
libel, blackmail, violations of rule lOb-5, solicitation of murder, and
more controversially, pornography, fighting words, and incitement
to riot. Yet much harmful speech is protected. Baker suggests that
the line between the two categories can be drawn using the concept
of coercion: coercive speech is unprotected. (As elsewhere in
presenting his own theory, Baker is a bit vague about whether his
remarks are intended to be rigorous and exhaustive, or merely illustrative.) This emphasis on coercion harmonizes with Baker's view
that the first amendment is intended to protect autonomy, because
coercion involves an attempt to overpower the will of another.
Unfortunately, the concept of coercion cannot bear the weight
placed upon it, and Baker's use of it becomes confused. 9 He starts
over by positing, without explaining their origins, three categories
of unprotected speech: 1) "speech involved in an actual or attempted taking of, or physical injury to, another's person or property," 2) "speech not chosen by the speaker" (such as commercial
speech), and 3) "speech designed to disrespect and distort the integrity of another's mental process or autonomy." Baker writes as if
the derivation of these categories from the values of personal autonomy and self-expression is straight forward. It is not. The general
problem Baker confronts is that the self-expressive activity and autonomy of citizens will at times conflict with each other. How is a
sadist to express his inner self without violating the autonomy of
another? (Masochists may not fully satisfy him-they are too easy.)
9. In an attempt to apply his analysis of coercion too widely, Baker greatly confuses
the analysis. He begins correctly: "The coerciveness of Theo's statement to Vickie, I will cut
and sell the flowers unless you plant a tree, should depend on whether the law has assigned
Theo the relevant rights in respect to flowers." Baker then falters: "[a] person's speech could
be coercive of, or an improper interference with, or an injury to others if society could and
did give others authority over the speaker's speech-that is, if society could provide that a
particular expression by a speaker violates someone else's right to have that expression not
spoken." Baker has transformed the locus of inquiry from the wrongfulness of the threatened
activity (does Theo have the right to eat the flowers?) to the wrongfulness of the talk (does
Theo have the right to threaten to cut the flowers?). The first excerpt exhibits the traditional
analysis of coercion; it grounded the moral analysis of Theo's speech on a pre-existing moral
evaluation of his rights over the flowers.
For an instructive and exhaustive presentation and analysis of the main philosophical
theories of coercion, see J. FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF (1986).
The second analysis is not about coercion specifically, but about wrongful speech in
general. And in the context of Baker's theory, it is circular: he gives us a theory of which
speech violates autonomy that amounts to "it depends on whether the speech violates
autonomy."
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There are two general, opposing methods for governing such conflicts. Following Hohfeld, we may call them the methods of rights
and liberties. Under Hohfeld's analysis, one has a liberty when one
is assured that the government will not intervene to stop one's activity; one has a right if the government will intervene to stop any
citizen from interrupting your activity. An overall scheme of rights
is provided, by, among others, John Stuart Mill: one's rights are
circumscribed by similar rights for all; your freedom to swing your
fist ends at your dean's nose; and both fist and nose are protected by
the state from assault by the other. A scheme of liberties is exemplified by Hobbes's account of the state of nature: each person is at
liberty to do whatever he or she wants: you and your neighbor are
at liberty to appropriate each other's cattle, and all fists are safe
from government interference, although no nose is safe from bashing. In short, the method of rights utilizes spheres of individual
activity protected by the government and designed not to conflict;
the method of liberties allows conflicts to be resolved privately without government interference. 10
Baker's core idea, that the first amendment establishes a circle
of liberty within which citizens may speak free of governmental interference, coheres well with the distinctions made above. Freedom
of speech is about liberty, not rights, freedom from government, not
protection by government from other citizens. Consider the contrast with private property, which is primarily a regime of rights,
not liberties. II Yet the liberties of speech must be effectively integrated into the larger legal framework dominated by rights. Where
speech liberties conflict with each other, and when they conflict
with property rights, Baker follows the scheme of Mill, not Hobbes.
He circumscribes and limits his liberties. Self-expression is not allowed to war upon self-autonomy or even upon property rights.
This choice might seem unexceptional, but it is no coincidence
that it is the method of John Stuart Mill, who after all is also a
prominent exponent of the marketplace theory of the first amendment. In order to circumscribe liberties and prevent conflict, one
must draw a line between liberties. Absent revelation from a higher
authority, to draw the lines between liberties, or between liberties
and rights, one must balance. To be a true absolutist first amendment libertarian, Baker would be forced to reinstitute Hobbes's
state of nature regarding speech: no libel laws, no protection of pri10. Notice that it is possible to use what I call the method of rights to resolve conflicts
among liberties and vice-versa.
II. Clearly in the real world, most institutions partake of both methods in varying
amounts. Competition among businesses for customers follows the method of liberty, for
example.
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vate property against speech, no exceptions for coercive speech. If
he wishes to fix limits by discussion rather than by fiat he must
balance. And so once again the distinction Baker attempts to draw
between marketplace theories and his own is undone.
Baker can of course disagree with particular marketplace theorists about how to balance. One can balance degrees of autonomy
and psychological health rather than utility. One can attempt principled balancing rather than ad hoc balancing. One can make a
single balance for each category rather than balancing case-by-case.
But one must balance.
Another problematic aspect of Baker's discussion is his attempt to appropriate the mantle of human liberty. Claiming that
one's own constitutional theory is a liberty or rights-based theory,
while opponents' theories are utilitarian or market theories, is a
common rhetorical move. One of the larger achievements of critical
legal studies is to have exploded this type of liberal claim. Claims of
liberty or right can be made on both sides of all constitutional issues. I do not say that all of these claims of liberty or right are
equally convincing, but they exist. One must give an account of the
content of our rights and liberties to advance the discussion.
Merely claiming to be on the side of liberty is not enough.
After all, utilitarians believe in liberties and rights, too. For
every Jeremy Bentham, who thought that rights were "nonsense on
stilts", there is a John Stuart Mill who uses utilitarianism to argue
for particular accounts of rights and liberties. Moreover, Bentham
believed in legal rules defining the justiciable rights of an individual;
he reserved his scorn for general moral and political rights. Utilitarian legal theorists are overwhelmingly rule utilitarians: they do not
oppose utilitarianism to a rights-based analysis, but instead use utilitarianism to define the content of particular legal rights. (That is,
rather than telling a judge to seek to maximize utility according to
the facts of the case, most utilitarians tell the judge in a case of first
impression to choose the doctrinal rule that maximizes utility.)
In first amendment cases, the liberties in conflict may both be
free speech claims; at other times the conflict is between speech and
some other protected liberty, such as property. Baker attempts to
finesse such conflicts by privileging some liberties over others:
speakers over listeners, individuals over organizations, private roles
over public roles, speech over property. But because any of these
choices becomes nonsensical when enforced absolutely, Baker also
admits, sotto voce, many exceptions. For example, although first
amendment liberties are more important than rights to private
property, the law of trespass is still to be enforced to keep speakers
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off your lawn. But because he does not want to admit he is choosing between liberties, let alone balancing, Baker only rarely explains--even when discussing cases-why he draws the line that he
does between conflicting liberties. Usually he magnifies the liberty
on one side and minimizes any claim of liberty one the other.
A more helpful approach to formulating a liberty theory of the
first amendment would give a particular justification of the content
of the liberty to be protected. Baker to some extent does present
such a theory-which he calls an autonomy or self-realization theory of the first amendment. Unfortunately, he does not work very
hard to define or explain the autonomy or self-realization on which
he bases his theory, perhaps because he thinks he has already distinguished his theory from others in his general assertion that his is a
liberty and not a marketplace theory.
The point of constructing a theory of an area of doctrine like
the first amendment, however, is to tell us which facts are crucial to
the proper resolution of cases. A self-realization theory of the first
amendment is helpful if it explains which facts trigger the protection of the amendment. To perform this function, the theory must
elaborate in some detail a conception of self-realization. Baker unfortunately does not go far enough.
One first might ask which aspects of the use of language are
most important in exercising autonomy or realizing the self. For
example, I would argue, contrary to Baker, that the listener's ability
to receive the widest possible range of information is at least as
important as the speaker's right to speak.12 But the key point is not
that some aspects of Baker's account of self-realization are controversial, but that he does not adequately justify his assertion that
speech is more important than listening. In general, as Fred
Schauer points out, a theory of the first amendment that states that
the amendment seeks to preserve a single value, such as autonomy,
must explain why speech rights are singled-out for protection. This
is a very difficult task, but it is crucial for a useful application of the
theory. All tough first amendment cases will involve a conflict of
interests, with free speech interests on one side and other interests
on the other. If the theory cannot explain why speech is more essential to preserving self-realization than all other interests, it does
not help resolve the tough case.
For example, Baker argues that people should be allowed to
12. An originalist could object that the language of the first amendment protects
speech, not listening, but that is an objection which hurts rather than helps Baker: it is
unlikely that the first amendment was drafted to promote self-realization if speech itself is not
the primary means of realizing the self.
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stage a protest march in a public street without a permit even when
they obstruct traffic. In describing the contending interests Baker
gives a full and subtle account of the interests of the demonstrators
and how a permit system harms those interests. He describes in
great detail the pressures confronting city government and why
courts should be skeptical about the balances local governments
strike. He pays relatively little attention to the interests of other
citizens. By disrupting traffic the protestors prevent drivers and
passengers from going on with their ordinary lives. They disrupt
not just "traffic", but classes, jobs, time with children and lovers,
time to speak and listen in other forums. Baker gives no argument
that the increase in self-realization for the protestors outweighs the
loss in self-realization to others; he fails even to consider the question. This makes a hard case easy, and it also misses a frequent
point of such a protest. When I took part in street demonstrations
during the Vietnam War, we purposefully shut down the major
road for commuting to the state capital for a week because we
thought business as usual should not be able to continue while
Vietnamese society was being destroyed and young men were being
drafted. If the disruption to others' lives we caused was justifiable,
it was not because of the self-realization we achieved. From the
standpoint of self-realization, we might as well have been nudists,
fascists, or simply irresponsible children. A more pointed political
account is required.l3
Baker also at times labels his theory an autonomy theorywhich might seem to promise a grounding in Kantian moral theory- as well as a self-realization theory-which would seem to call
for a grounding in a psychological theory of the development of the
self. Baker makes greatest use of the notion of autonomy in his
discussion of commercial speech. He takes the unusual position, for
a first amendment quasi-absolutist, that commercial speech that is
"profit-motivated" should not be protected. Baker argues that the
"forced profit orientation" of commercial enterprises "is not a manifestation of individual freedom or choice." Neither does commercial speech have "any logical or intrinsic connection to anyone's
13. Another example: Baker could more effectively argue for lesser protection for com·
mercia! speech if he elaborated his theory of self-realization. Margaret Jane Radin has
presented a two-tier theory of property law that advocates stronger protection for personal
property that is essential to the development of the self than for property held only for commercial purposes. Thus the family home would be protected more strongly than a half-interest in a gas station. Baker could develop a similar two-tier theory of speech if he gave a more
nuanced account of the psychological development of the self and explained which speech is
not essential to it.
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substantive values or personal wishes." Commercial speech does
not express a person's values, it only instrumentally advances them.
The commercial speech discussion illustrates the dangers of
waiting to develop an account of autonomy in context. His argument is unsatisfactory because his description of autonomy is never
made rich enough to explain why some autonomy claims are preferred to others. The result Baker reaches denigrates the autonomy
interests of consumers interested in alternative products: consider
the ways in which regulation of attorneys' advertising was used to
attempt to restrict the growth of low-cost legal clinics. Baker when
discussing theory says that he will ignore the interests of listeners
and assume that there will be a speaker whose liberty is at stake to
advance the claim, but that claim is highly implausible here because
Baker has disqualified from first amendment protection the speakers
with the greatest incentive to provide the information. This argument also ignores those theorists who argue that the market enhances autonomy. I do not find their claims any more persuasive
than Baker's, but he should at least explain how his notion of autonomy differs from theirs, or how they are mistaken about the effects
of the market.I4
Another problem with Baker's approach is that he cannot effectively distinguish commercial speech from non-commercial
speech in the way he would like. Baker attempts to distinguish the
two both by means of causation and by means of the extent to
which the speech expresses the self. At first he seems to claim that
the content of commercial speech is caused by market forces, but
under the scientific understanding of causation, it is assumed that
all speech is caused. The distinctions between voluntary and involuntary action in criminal and tort law do not suggest a distinction
between commercial and noncommercial speech, nor do the doctrines of duress and coercion in contract law. Under psychological
theory, much political and artistic speech is driven by passions
equally as compelling as the fear of bankruptcy. Baker might con14. Baker also seeks to identify his autonomy theory with first amendment theories that
celebrate democracy, although he explicitly maintains that democracy is for him a means to
the end of autonomy and not vice versa. This identification of democracy and autonomy is
troubling in a constitutional theory of rights and liberties. As Robert Paul Wolff convincingly demonstrated in In Defense of Anarchism, there is a serious tension between autonomy
(which Wolff defined in the Kantian sense as the self-rule of a rational moral agent) and
democracy. Why should an autonomous agent feel bound by the results of an election if the
agent voted for the losing side? To follow the rule set by the majority is to follow the rule of
others and not one's own best moral and rational self; it is heteronomy and not autonomy.
The constitutional analogue to this philosophical tension is the paradox of judicial review:
how does a democracy justify allowing unelected judges to invalidate laws passed by properly
elected legislatures? Individual autonomy can conflict with democracy, or what is the first
amendment for?
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tend that the passions underlying politics and art belong to the self,
while the passions driving commercial success do not, but a rereading of Dreiser and Dickens, if not personal observation, should convince him that many of the same fears and desires underlie both.
Newspapers are run for profit, and Shakespeare may have been trying to get rich.
Baker's argument is also dangerous to his own political values.
The same argument against protection of a category of speech
which was externally imposed and not reflective of an autonomous
self was made in the fifties to explain why communists could be
appropriately discharged from academic positions. If party discipline is not causally distinguishable from market discipline, Baker
must present a theory of what speech is truly expressive of the self,
or alternatively, what speech helps realize the autonomous self.
Such a theory, however, would seem to cut against the underlying
motivation for Baker's theory. Libertarian theorists ordinarily seek
the widest possible sphere for individuals to pursue their own vision
of the good life consistent with a like liberty for all. A psychological theory that distinguishes sharply between authentic self-expression and inauthentic self-expression would thereby distinguish
between authentic and inauthentic uses of liberty. This would constrict the range of visions of the good life that citizens would be
allowed to pursue. Various radical and communitarian theorists are
willing to accept such a result, but Baker's rhetoric is greatly to the
contrary.
Even if Baker were to adopt a radical critique of capitalism, the
distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech would
not survive. Social theorists in the Marxist tradition use the concepts of alienation, hegemony, and the fetishism of commodities to
explain how a capitalist economic system distorts public speech and
makes it inauthentic. However, these radical theories all apply
equally to commercial and noncommercial speech; novels and political slogans are just as subject to the distortions of commodity fetishism as are advertisements.Is Thus Baker cannot rely on such
theories to support his analysis of commercial speech.
Baker could strengthen his position by disentangling the commercial/noncommercial speech distinction from the individual/corporate speech distinction. Some of his examples draw their intuitive
power from the sense that a corporate spokesperson is speaking for
15. For two differing explanations of commodity fetishism that agree on this point, see
Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism of Commodities, 34
AM. L. REV. 939 (1985); G.A. COHEN, KARL MARX's THEORY OF HISTORY: A DEFENSE
(1979).
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the organization and not for herself. From a libertarian perspective,
a plausible argument could be made that freedom of corporate
speech is only of instrumental value, while freedom of individual
speech is intrinsically valuable. (There will still be problems in disaggregating the two in particular situations.) But not all commercial speech is corporate speech-consider advertising by a sole
practitioner, who specializes in the plaintiff's side of personal injury
suits, or the local mom-and-pop drugstore. Baker's writings stand
out from other progressive commentators precisely because he
would deny protection to commercial speech and not merely give
corporations fewer speech rights than individuals. Baker may be
right, but he has yet to find the most persuasive form for his arguments. If he wants to keep his individualist focus, he needs a more
compelling psychological description of autonomy that convincingly distinguishes commercial speech from other speech. Alternatively, he could argue that an adequately functioning marketplace
of ideas is a prerequisite to full personal autonomy, and use market
failure arguments to justify a lesser protection for commercial
speech.

III
To his credit, Professor Baker discusses at length many of the
first amendment issues that pose the most difficult challenges for his
theory. Baker's theory is designed for cases with a sharp conflict
between individuals and government: parade permits, speech in the
park, and so on. The difficult cases for his simple model are those
where opposing individuals make conflicting claims on the government, and government is implicated in constructing the arena of
speech: notably, regulation of broadcasting and cable television,
special rights for the press, or access claims to the press by individuals. Baker devotes several chapters to such problems. His basic approach is to create a large ad hoc exception to his liberty theory for
the press, hung on the textual peg of the press clause. Baker is willing to give special first amendment protections to the press, beyond
the sphere of protected individual speech, on the instrumentalist
grounds of Vincent Blasi's "checking function." Baker's discussion
of detailed issues is always informed and interesting. He reaches
numerous controversial conclusions: for instance, that cable television should be structured, at least in part, as a common carrier; and
that the first (enforced coverage) prong of the fairness doctrine was
constitutional but the second (balance) prong was not. The discussion of each issue, however, is sketchy, in part because he takes on
so many of the press and mass media issues that he is unable to

180

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 8:164

devote much space to the complexities of any one of them. (Parade
permits, a simpler issue, is discussed at considerably greater length.)
But the thinness of the discussion is also a symptom of the ad hoc
nature of the analysis. The theory developed in the first two thirds
of the book, whatever its strengths and faults, is treated as irrelevant and Baker develops a second theoretical framework to which
he devotes less attention.
I do not mean to suggest that all analysis of first amendment
problems must be tied to one overarching theory to be valuable.
The attacks by Fred Schauer and Steve Shiffrin on unitary theories
of the amendment present a strong case. But Baker in the first two
thirds of the book purports to be offering a unitary theory of the
amendment, and he specifically attacks and rejects theories ("market failure" theories) whose analysis he in some measure appropriates as his own when discussing the mass media. And since he
incorporates the arguments of the market failure theorists only implicitly, and only relates them to one specific press issue at a time,
his discussion seems quite ad hoc and strongly tied to his own political and moral intuitions.
I think my disagreements with Baker over his use of theory
and his criticisms of other theorists arise in large part from a disagreement over what constitutes the core of contemporary first
amendment theory. Baker seems to consider parade permit and
time, place and manner cases as the core of the first amendment.
His theory is designed to achieve the correct results in such cases,
and opposing theories are criticized predominantly for failing to do
so. Mass media cases are treated as the periphery, and so ad hoc
exceptions to his theory made to cover such cases can be treated as
details rather than the creation of a hybrid theory. For many of the
market failure theorists, on the other hand, and for me, mass media
cases, corporate speech cases and campaign financing cases are the
key first amendment issues of our time, while parade permit and
speaker in the park cases are only moderately important, and are
intellectually much less complex and difficult to resolve.
This difference should not be overstated. We both begin with
the standard story of the development of free speech. From the
dawn of the invigoration of the first amendment to the end of the
1950s, the central free speech issue was limiting government reaction to subversion. In the 1960s, the focus of attention widened to
speech arising from protest movements or general political activism:
the public forum doctrine and time, place and manner restrictions
began to receive more analysis than the clear and present danger
test. (Even seemingly unrelated doctrinal areas, such as libel,
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evolved under the pressure of protest and reaction, as embodied in
New York Times v. Sullivan.)
Subversion is no longer at the center of the first amendment
agenda for Baker, or any other current theorist, because we all assume the practical battle has been (tenuously) won, that no new
major controversies are imminent, and that our theory adequately
addresses the problem. Baker, and many other first amendment
theorists, still treat public forum cases as the paradigmatic first
amendment cases, presumably because they are still a source of major controversy with important political ramifications and they are
thought to present the central puzzle a first amendment theory must
explain. My partial disagreement with such a judgment may be in
large part an unreflective, resigned acceptance of the current public
forum cases, just as we all may turn out to have been too complacent about issues of subversion if "terrorism" in the future provokes
the same governmental reactions that communism provoked in the
past.
I would argue, however, that for supporters of the system of
freedom of expression, and especially for those like Baker and me
who believe that this country still requires substantial changes to
achieve social justice, the most important current free speech issues
concern the mass media and campaign financing. Credible arguments can and are being made that the entire current scheme of
regulation of both broadcasting and cable television are unconstitutional; these arguments have been accepted, in part, by various
courts and agencies. Concurrently, citizens and public interest
groups argue that the first amendment requires access to the mass
media, or at least permits Congress to implement an access scheme,
as it has done for cable television. This position too is credible and
has been adopted in part by various courts and agencies. The practical effect of organizing broadcast and cable television as unregulated private entities, regulated quasi-public entities, or as common
carriers, are immense both for our everyday lives and for our political system. Moreover, first amendment doctrine and theory does
not handle such issues well. I am not so concerned here with results, although those are important, but with bringing out the most
important contextual factors in a way that expresses the full appeal
of each side of the dispute. Current doctrine fails miserably. The
current formula for resolution of cable television problems is the
O'Brien test: a general balancing test designed for incidental restrictions on arguably expressive actions such as draft card burnings. In
the context of cable television it provides almost no guidance as to
what facts are important or how they are to be balanced; as a result
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the cable television regulation cases taken as a group are wildly inconsistent and taken separately often seem to miss the point of what
is at stake in each case.
I believe that we should rethink general first amendment theory starting with what are currently the most important practical
and most puzzling theoretical problems. This may be too complacent in considering past achievements as irrevocably established,
but it seems much easier to design a theory to help decide the mass
media cases and then modify it to retain our understanding of
speaker in the park cases than the reverse. Baker's book is practically proof of the point; if this able first amendment scholar can
only deal with mass media cases by developing a second, subsidiary
theory, I do not expect anyone else to do much better. These cases
deserve their own spotlight, not the reflected glow from old
battlefields.
I am not sure how one finally identifies the central first amendment issues and so decides between Baker's intuitions and my own.
Many first amendment teachers will find Baker's account congenial
because it meshes well with certain arbitrary features of casebooks
and the law school curriculum. The first amendment course in
many law schools does not cover all free speech cases. Mass media
cases, particularly involving the details of regulation of broadcasting and cable television, are often taught in a separate, more specialized course. The leading constitutional law casebooks devote
hundreds of pages to the clear and present danger test and the public forum doctrine, but leave discussion of mass media issues to a
small section on special problems at the end of the first amendment
material.I6 There are good historical reasons for this, but for training first amendment lawyers and for directing new scholarship, our
casebooks are out-of-date.
If I have been critical of Baker's first amendment theory, let me
finish with an appreciation of his strengths. On every problem he
discusses, Baker illuminates facets previously undisclosed. He so
frequently and energetically explores the arguments against his own
position that he might contend that I have borrowed many of my
criticisms/rom him, and that my disagreements are merely matters
of placement of emphasis between foreground and background,
principle and exception. The reader will find in this book an endless
number of cogent, well-considered arguments on a wide array of
16. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 1416-61 (lith ed. 1985). Slightly
more material can be found in W. LocKHART, Y. KAMISER, J. CHOPER, and S. SH!FFRIN,
CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 561-634 (6th ed. 1981).
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first amendment topics, presented with greater clarity than one expects in an academic work.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE SUPREME COURT.
Edited by Leonard W. Levy, 1 Kenneth L. Karst,2 and Dennis
J. Mahoney.J New York, N.Y.: MacMillan Publishing Company. 1990. Pp. xix, 375. Paper, $12.95.
Gerald Caplan 4

This paperback book is a collection of essays (96 in all) on constitutional criminal procedure, culled from the Encyclopedia of the
American Constitution (1986). It is intended, the publishers say, as
an "overview of the development of criminal justice in the United
States, from the framing of the Bill of Rights up to and including
the Burger Court."5 Although written and edited by leading constitutional scholars, and containing some first rate contributions, the
collection, surprisingly, disappoints. Many of the contributions are
out of date; others are too short to be useful, even as an
introduction.
In general, the essays avoid polemics, seeking to inform rather
than persuade. Although occasionally an author argues for or
against a decision or theory, such evaluations are ordinarily brief.
For the most part, the authors proceed descriptively, seeking to
compress decades of precedent into a few sentences or paragraphs.
At their best, the essays are creative syntheses, showing the stretch,
the zigs and zags of constitutional development; but they are rarely
at their best.
Many are just too short. At a page or two, some read like a
long Black's Law Dictionary entry or an excerpt from a nutshell.
Professor Leonard Levy's explanation of entrapment in two pages,
for example, is of limited value. It may provide some assistance to a
lay reader struggling to understand recent highly-publicized trials
where the defense was raised, but the subject is too complex for
such an abbreviated treatment. Similarly, the page and a half treatI. Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Humanities and History, Claremont Graduate
School.
2. Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles.
3. Professor of Political Science, California State University, San Bernadino.
4. Professor, National Law Center, George Washington University.
5. Publisher's Note, p. xix. I have drawn upon the publisher to characterize the volume and its intended audience because the otherwise excellent introduction by Professor
Wayne LaFave oddly makes no reference to the essays themselves.

